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Abstract: As a result of the recent financial crisis and the ensuing economic recession, fiscal
deficits have soared in many OECD countries. As a consequence, government debt has been on
the rise again after a period of stable or declining government debt. In this paper we analyze debt
stabilization in a country that features endogenous risk premia, imposed by financial markets that
evaluate the probability of debt default by governments. Endogenous risk premia arise by assuming
e.g. simple linear relations between risk premia and the level of debt. As a result the real interest
rate on government debt can be written as a constant (measuring the risk-free real interest rate
corrected for real output growth) plus an endogenous risk premium that depends on the debt level.
We bring such endogenous risk premia into the Tabellini (1986) model [22] and analyze the impact of
it. This gives rise to a nonlinear differential game. We solve this game for both a cooperative setting
and a non-cooperative setting. The non-cooperative game is solved under an open-loop information
structure. In particular we present a bifurcation analysis w.r.t. the risk premium parameter.
Keywords: debt stabilization, differential games, nonlinear dynamical systems, economic dynamics.
JEL codes: C7,C62,E6,F4,H6
1 Introduction
In many OECD countries, government debt stabilization has recently moved to the center of interest.
This can be explained by the fact that the global financial crisis in 2008 and the ensuing economic
slowdown plus fiscal balance deterioration, has shifted government debt levels up significantly and in
a rapid manner in many countries. Government debt stabilization is again a high priority on many
policymakers’ agendas, together with restoring financial stability and economic growth. Financial
markets are adding pressures by requiring risk premia on sovereign debt of countries that appear
particularly vulnerable to potential default giving their levels of debt and pessimistic prospects for
budgetary consolidation and growth recovery. In the euro area, the debt stabilization problems
have lead to additional difficulties that are of a more systematic nature: in the absence of national
monetary policy instruments, member states are unable to use monetary policy to finance budgetary
1
deficits neither directly (by ”printing money”) nor indirectly (by ”buying government bonds by the
central bank of a member country”). This increases the pressure on other member states to bail-out
insolvent member states and the pressure on the ECB to lend to countries that are under threat of
financial markets. So far, Ireland, Greece and Portugal have indeed received support programmes to
address short-run difficulties in meeting their financial obligations.
Aim of this paper is to analyze government debt stabilization problems in the presence of endoge-
nous risk premia, in a theoretical framework. It is also in this European sovereign debt crisis context
that we analyze debt stabilization in a country that faces considerable interest rate differentials with
respect to German government bonds and where these differentials have been caused through na-
tional idiosyncrasies, i.e. a country that is subject to endogenous risk premia on its government
debt. Our analytical framework extends the elegant debt stabilization game of Tabellini [22]. In
that stabilization game, the monetary and fiscal authorities are engaged in a dynamic conflict of
debt stabilization. Using this model, different types of equilibria can be considered: cooperative
(”Pareto”) vs. non-cooperative (”Nash”) equilibria, hierarchical (”Stackelberg”) vs non-hierarchical
equilibria, and the implications in terms of adjustment dynamics and steady-states of government
debt, budget deficits and money growth be assessed. While the original model is based on a constant
interest rate, we introduce a risk premium that depends on the level of debt, changing the original
linear debt stabilization game into a non-linear one.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model we analyze in this paper. In
Section 3 we solve the model under a non-cooperative mode of play. The effect of the endogenous
risk premium is analyzed in detail. Section 4 considers a cooperative mode of play. Again the effects
of the introduction of the endogenous risk premium are studied in detail. Section 5 highlights some
additional differences between both modes of play. Finally Section 6 summarizes some conclusions
and contains some concluding remarks.
2 Government debt stabilization with endogenous risk pre-
mia: a dynamic game
The government debt stabilization model of Tabellini [22] considers the problem of government debt
stabilization as a dynamic game between monetary and fiscal authorities. Both are assumed to have
an interest in government debt stabilization and their own instrument that contributes to achieve this
objective. The fiscal authority can reduce the primary fiscal deficit -either by increasing taxes or by
reducing government spending-, reducing thereby the accumulation of debt. The monetary authority
can increase monetary financing. Monetary financing takes the form of (base) money growth and in
a more modern form of buying government debt by the central bank.
Several extensions of the model exist. Van Aarle et al. [1] consider government debt stabilization
issues in a two-country monetary union model extension of the Tabellini model. Weeren et al.
[23] and Engwerda [8] analyze the existence and asymptotic behaviour of feedback Nash and open-
loop Nash equilibria of LQ dynamic games and the lastmentioned paper applies this analysis to
the Tabellini debt stabilization game. Van den Broek [2] situates the debt stabilization game in a
moving horizon dynamic game that could e.g. approximate regular elections of new policymakers. It
is found that a shorter planning horizon reduces the debt stabilization efforts in the Nash open-loop
case. Castren [4] considers the finite time horizon variant of the debt stabilization model to consider
electoral effects in the form of end-point debt targets. Di Bartolomeo and Di Gioacchino [5] analyze
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the Stackelberg open-loop equilibria of the debt stabilization game, showing that these lead to a
further reduction in debt stabilization efforts compared to the Nash case. Figuieres [12] considers the
Tabellini debt stabilization game in the context of an n-country extension where countries consider
to join a monetary union and how this changes the strategic incentives.
The setup of the debt stabilization model is as follows. Consider a country consisting of one fiscal
authority and one central bank (CB) that is responsible for the monetary policy. The accumulation
of government debt is given by the dynamic government budget constraint that relates government
debt, interest payments, monetary financing and primary fiscal deficits:
ḋ(t) = r(t)d(t) + f(t)−m(t) (1)
in which d denotes government debt scaled to the level of national output, ri denotes the real interest
rate (adjusted for the rate of output growth which is assumed to be constant in the remainder of
this paper) and f denotes the primary fiscal deficit, also scaled to output. The monetary financing
undertaken by the CB, measured as a fraction of aggregate output, is denoted by m.1 Note also that
a negative value of government debt implies that the government has obtained a claim on private
sector assets.
The fiscal policymaker sets the primary fiscal deficit with the aim of minimizing its loss function.
We assume that the fiscal authority is concerned with deviations of the fiscal deficit and government






e−θt{(f(t)− f̄)2 + βF (d(t)− d̄F )2}dt. (2)
The CB is concerned about money growth and debt stabilization. As a consequence, the objective






e−θt{(m(t)− m̄)2 + βM(d(t)− d̄M)2}dt. (3)
βF and βM indicate the relative preferences concerning debt stabilization of the fiscal authorities
and the CB, respectively2. From the loss functions we see that three factors determine very much
the policy actions: (i) the relative weights given to debt stabilization, (ii) the target values for debt,
deficit and money and (iii) the initial conditions w.r.t. government debt. Finally, θ denotes the
discount factor. We will assume, moreover, that both fiscal and monetary authorities do not allow
debt to grow forever3. Their goal is to stabilize debt at some steady state value using policies that
also converge to steady states. So, the set of admissible control policies considered in this paper is
given by the next set of locally square integrable functions
1The total money stock m(t) appears in budget constraint (1) conform Tabellini’s model and some related papers.
More recent papers use the nominal long term interest rate i(t) as the CB’s instrument and no money in the government
debt accumulation equation (see e.g. [7]). Since we are focusing on Tabelini’s model, our approach seems reasonable.
To model debt stabilization games with the nominal long term interest rate i(t) as the CB’s instrument and no money
in the government debt accumulation equation remains a topic for future research.
2Note that, by considering f̄ = βff(t), m̄ = βmm(t), d̄F = βdfd(t) and d̄M = βdmd(t), this set-up includes the
analysis of debt sustainability problems (see e.g. [17] and [16]). We will not further specialize our outcomes for this
special case here.
3This assumption of a bounded steady-state level of debt implies the no-Ponzi game condition holds which imposes
that the discounted value of debt tends to zero when time goes to infinity (see also the appendix).
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U := {(f(.), m(.)) ∈ L2,loc | lim
t→∞
f(t) = f e, lim
t→∞
m(t) = me, lim
t→∞
d(t) = de}.
In the original Tabellini model and the subsequent literature the real interest rate on government
debt remained constant so that the accumulation of government debt is determined by a linear
first-order differential equation. The recent government debt crises in the EMU countries Portugal,
Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain (PIIGS)4 and several other cases, mostly outside the EMU as e.g.
Iceland5, witness the presence of risk-premia in (sovereign) bond yields in cases where countries have
high levels of government debt. In the Greek crisis e.g. the risk premium on Greek bonds vs German
bonds reached a level of more than 10 percent.
It seems interesting to bring such endogenous risk premia into the Tabellini model and analyze
the effects of it. This is also particularly interesting in relation to the functioning of the monetary
union. It has been argued that financial markets could be helpful in disciplining fiscal authorities:
countries with high debt would face high risk premia, whereas countries with high fiscal discipline
and low debt pay little or no risk premia. However, others have pointed at potential adverse effects
on fiscal discipline in monetary unions in case no bail-out clauses are not credible. In that case
rising debt in one country could raise doubt that the common central bank and/or the disciplined
countries in the end will be forced to bail out the high debt countries. In that case also interest rates
in countries with low debt could rise as the result of spillover, contagion from countries with high
debt.
Endogenous risk premia arise by assuming e.g. simple linear relations between risk premia and
the level of debt. As a result the real interest rate on government debt can be written as a constant
(measuring the risk-free real interest rate corrected for real output growth) plus an endogenous risk
premium that depends on the debt level. We assume,
r(t) = r̄ + αd(t). (4)
Empirical studies on determinants of risk premia, see e.g. Baldacci and Kumar [6] and the literature
therein, confirm indeed that the government debt level is one of the crucial determinants of sovereign
bond risk premia. The empirical estimates for α in their literature overview are typically between
0.02 and 0.08. De Grauwe and Ji [13], in an interesting analysis of the current European debt crisis,
assume that financial markets initially underpriced risk in the euro area government bond markets.
With the advent of the European debt crisis, however, financial markets appear to overreact and
overprice these risks in the case of the PIIGS countries. In their empirical estimations, the value of
α increases from 0.01 in the pre-crisis period before 2008 to 0.10 after 2008.
4Notice that Spain has a (though strongly increasing!) debt-to-GDP ratio well below to that of the other countries
mentioned (74,1% in 2011 vis-á-vis 165,1% for Greece, 127,7% for Italy, 112,6% for Ireland and 111,9% for Portugal
(see OECD [18]), but is confronted with a huge banking crisis problem.
5With a debt-to-GDP ratio of 127,3% in 2011 (see OECD [18]).
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3 Non-Cooperative Debt Stabilization: The Nash Open-
loop Case
In this section we consider the game (1-4) under the assumption that the players have an open-loop
information structure6 about the game. We assume that players act non-cooperatively and play a
Nash strategy. That is, they look for actions that have the property that a unilateral deviation
from these actions makes them worse off. Clearly this type of strategies is just an ”approximate” of
real-life strategic behavior. However, since punishment strategies might be enforced in case policy
makers do not stick to their commitments, the assumption that players will stick to the agreement
is not too unrealistic in this setting.
In the Appendix we prove the next theorem.
Theorem 3.1 If (f ∗(.), m∗(.)) ∈ U is a set of open-loop Nash strategies for (1-4), there exist a






















βF d̄F + βM d̄M
]
, (5)
with d∗(0) = d0 and where both lim
t→∞
d∗(t) = de and lim
t→∞
µ∗(t) = µe exist. Furthermore the steady
state values (de, µe) satisfy
µe := r̄de + αde
2
+ f̄ − m̄, (6)
where de is a solution of the third order polynomial equation
g(d) := −2α2d3 + α(θ − 3r̄)d2 + γ1d+ γ0 = 0. (7)
Here γ1 := −b− 2α(f̄ − m̄) and γ0 := βF d̄F + βM d̄M + (f̄ − m̄)(θ− r̄) with b := r̄(r̄− θ) + βF + βM .

In the proof of the above theorem it is also shown that (5) has no periodic solutions. Furthermore it
is shown that if the steady state value of debt is positive, the steady state value of monetary spending
is larger than the steady state value of fiscal deficit.
The costate variable µ is the sum of the costate variables associated with the individual opti-
mization problems of the players (see the Appendix). In the open-loop information case, the costate
variables do not represent/measure the value at time t of having an additional unit of the state
variable at time t to each player (i.e. the shadow price interpretation breaks down in this case see,
e.g., [3]). So, µ(t) can not be directly interpreted as the sum of the additional cost of both players
associated with having a one-unit higher debt at time t. However, as we will see later on, the steady
state value of µ is also obtained as the steady state of the costate variable associated with the so-
lution of a cooperative equilibrium in which the relative preference concerning debt stabilization of
the central bank are changed. Since the costate variable in this cooperative solution does have the
shadow price interpretation, it shows that the costate µ in the non-cooperative game is also closely
related to the total additional cost of a higher debt level.
6That is, at time t = 0 both players have all information about the game, determine their actions, which are then
enforced as binding agreements for the whole planning horizon.
5
In this paper we focus on (the steady state value of) debt and the consequences of an endogenous
risk premium on it. To calculate the equilibrium debt trajectory and strategies one might proceed as
follows. Below we will show that the interesting steady state points of (5) are saddle-points. Using
this, one can construct then uniquely from (5) the corresponding saddle paths (d∗(.), µ∗(.)) and
therefore the debt trajectory d∗(.). Corollary 6.1 in the Appendix provides the steady state points
for the system (25). In case the corresponding linearized system has one unstable and two stable
eigenvalues (which is the case in our benchmark Example 3.5) one can calculate from this system
(25) (uniquely) the corresponding equilibrium strategies. Another way, which often helps to gain
insight into the dynamics of the system, is to consider the first part of solutions of the corresponding
long finite planning horizon problem.
Before we analyze the effect of the endogenous risk premium in this model we first recall in the
next subsection some results from the literature if this premium is zero.
3.1 No Endogenous Risk Premium
If α = 0, the model (1-4) reduces to the Tabellini model [22] (where additionally d̄F = d̄M = 0 was
considered). From [9][Section 7.8.1] we recall the next results concerning a slightly extended version
of this Tabellini game.
Proposition 3.2 Consider the game (1-4) with α = 0, d̄F = d̄M and b > 0.
1. This game has a unique set of admissible equilibrium actions that allow for a feedback synthesis.
2. This game has a unique set of admissible equilibrium actions if the policymakers are sufficiently
impatient, i.e., if θ > 2r̄.
3. This game has an infinite number of admissible equilibrium actions if θ < 2r̄. However, all
equilibrium actions yield the same closed-loop system. Furthermore, equilibrium actions converge to
the same steady state.
4. The steady state values of debt, fiscal policy and monetary policy are: de = γ0
b
, f e = f̄−βF (r̄d̄F+f̄−m̄)
b
and me = m̄− βM
βF
(f e − f̄), respectively. 
The intuition behind part 3. of this proposition is that in case the uncontrolled growth of debt gets
large compared to its discounting in the cost function, there is a large need to stabilize debt since
the cost grows exponentially. Therefore many equilibrium strategies occur.
The results in this proposition are (partially) confirmed below. In the Appendix we prove the
next result for our slightly more general model.
Proposition 3.3 Consider the game (1-4) with α = 0.
The game has a unique steady state value of debt de = γ0
b
, for every initial state d0, if b > 0.




So if b < 0 the problem has for most initial states no solution, a result also shown by Tabellini. Such
cases arise if, e.g., θ > r and βF and βM are relatively small. That is, in cases where the authorities
don’t care too much about the future development of debt.
3.2 A Phase Plane Analysis with Endogenous Risk Premium
In Figure 1 we plotted, in case ρ := (θ−r̄)(βF+βM )
2α
− (βF d̄F + βM d̄M) < 0, the phase plane diagram














Figure 1: Phase plane diagram of system (5) if ρ < 0.
corresponding phase plane diagrams in case ρ = 0 and ρ > 0 are presented in the Appendix. Figure
1 illustrates that depending on the location of the isoclines three different situations can occur. The
phase plane diagram can have either one, two or three steady states. The ḋ = 0 isocline is given by
µ = αd2 + r̄d+ f̄ − m̄ whereas the µ̇ = 0 isocline equals µ = θ−r̄
2α
+ ρ
θ−r̄−2αd . Notice that the location
of the horizontal asymptote of the µ̇ = 0 isocline is µ = −βF+βM
2α
< 0. Furthermore the location
of the vertical asymptote of the µ̇ = 0 isocline, d = θ−r̄
2α
, is located to the right of the location of
the minimum value of the ḋ = 0 isocline, i.e. d = − r̄
2α
. This implies that if ρ < 0 and there are
three steady states, at least one of them is associated with a negative value of steady state debt, de.
Only in case ρ > 0 it is possible to have 3 positive steady states for the debt. The precise location
of the steady states depends on the specific values that the model parameters have. So if, e.g.,
4α(f̄ − m̄)− r2 > 0, it follows that the minimum value of the ḋ = 0 isocline will be nonnegative and,
consequently, the steady state value of µe will always be positive. Furthermore, if ρ < 0, simulations
show that in case there are 3 steady states, for some choice of parameters the middle one will be a
node whereas for other choices it will be a focus.
3.3 Number of Steady States with Endogenous Risk Premium
The next proposition, which proof can be found in the Appendix, provides a precise characterization
of the number of steady states.
Proposition 3.4 Let s := θ − 3r̄ and
h(α) := 8γ31 − 36αγ0γ1s− 4αγ0s3 − 108α2γ20 + γ21s2. (8)
The game (1-4) has
1. one steady state value of debt if either i) h(α) < 0 or ii) h(α) = 0 and α2s2 = 3γ1;
2. two steady state values of debt (from which one only applies as an open-loop equilibrium if d0 = d
e)
if h(α) = 0 and α2s2 6= 3γ1;
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3. three steady state values of debt (from which the middle only applies as an open-loop equilibrium
if d0 = d
e) if h(α) > 0. 
The most important difference if one compares both Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 is that the consequence
of including a risk premium is that the phase plane diagram always has at least one saddle-point.
Example 3.5 As the benchmark case we will consider in this paper the next parameters: θ = 0.1,
f̄ = 0.01, m̄ = 0, d̄F = 0.6, d̄M = 0.6, βF = 0.04, βM = 0.04, r̄ = 0.03 and α = 0.05. Note that
this benchmark case essentially emerges for broad -economically relevant- ranges of parameter values
(with of course outcomes that will differ in numerical terms). For this case there is a unique steady
state (de, µe) = (0.6055, 0.0465). It is easily verified that for this benchmark case h(α) < 0 for all
α > 0. So there is a unique steady state for all α > 0. That is, independent of the choice of the risk
premium we see that the steady state value of debt does not depend on the initial debt. 
3.4 Effect of Endogenous Risk Premium on Steady State Debt and Ac-
tions
Under the assumption that ∂g
∂d
(α, de(α)) 6= 0 it follows from (7) that de is a continuous differentiable
function of α and that de
′




where the partial derivatives are evaluated at (α, de(α)).
From (28) we have
∂g
∂d
= −6α2d2 + 2α(θ − 3r̄)d+ γ1 and (9)
∂g
∂α
= d2(θ − r̄ − 2αd)− 2dµ = d[−4αd2 + (θ − 3r̄)d− 2(f̄ − m̄)]. (10)
So, e.g., if f̄ ≥ m̄ and θ ≤ 3r̄, ∂g
∂α
< 0. Consequently, if under these parameter assumptions the game
has a unique positive steady state value of debt (and therefore ∂g
∂d
(α, de(α)) < 0), de
′
(α) < 0. So the
steady state value of debt decreases in those cases if α becomes larger. The intuition is that in case
debt growths substantially (compared to the discounting in the cost function again), there is a large
need to stabilize the system. The larger α is the larger the destabilization effect becomes. Therefore
it is better to reduce debt more substantially in case α gets larger.
In case there is no risk premium, i.e. α = 0, ∂g
∂α
= d[(θ − 3r̄)d − 2(f̄ − m̄)]. For our benchmark
parameters, with no risk premium, de(0) = 0.6252. Substitution of this into the previous formula
shows that at α = 0 for this value of de, ∂g
∂α
< 0 too. So one can expect that for small values of α for
our benchmark parameters ∂g
∂α
< 0 too. We verified this numerically in Figure 2. From Figure 2a we
observe that the impact of α and hence of the endogenous risk premium on the steady state value of
debt is not that high; α = 0.05 implies that the steady state value of debt is reduced by approximately
3.3%. Furthermore we observe that the negative relationship between α and the steady state value
of debt seems to be almost linear. Moreover it is shown that the steady state risk premium is a
(hardly visible in the graph, but slightly) concave function of α which increases to approximately
0.058 for α = 0.1. Panel b shows the partial derivatives of g w.r.t. α and d, respectively, at the
steady state value as a function of α. In particular this plot indicates that de
′





from approximately −0.1 to −0.8 if α increases from 0 to 0.1. So, from this plot we conclude that
there is not a strict linear relationship between α and de but that the impact of the risk premium on












−0.1 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10













0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
(b) Partial derivatives as a function of α.
Figure 2: Debt, premium and partial derivatives as a function of α for the benchmark parameters.
In Figure 3 we plotted for the benchmark parameters the corresponding steady state control





, we see a similar behavior of both
steady state monetary and fiscal policies. That is, both policies are more actively used if the risk
premium increases. We also see that this effect becomes less the larger the risk premium is. Note
again that a negative value of the fiscal deficit, f , implies a fiscal surplus.
It is also possible to give an explicit expression for the derivative of the steady state strategies






(α)(θ − r̄ − 2αde) + (2de + 2αd′(α))(de − d̄F )), with
de
′
(α) as mentioned above. For the benchmark parameters it follows that ∂f
e
∂α




Tabellini proved (in his Proposition 3) that in the non-cooperative case, a reduction in the weight
attached to debt stabilization by one player: (i) reduces the adjustment speed, (ii) increases the
steady-state stabilization burden for the other player and (iii) increases steady-state debt. Figure 4
illustrates that for small values of α, debt indeed decreases if the weight attached by the policymakers
to debt stabilization increases. However, this effect may reverse for larger values of α: in case
α = 0.1, an increase in the weight attached to debt stabilization, increases steady state debt. In
other words, the result found by Tabellini generalizes to the case where the nonlinearity introduced
by the risk premium mechanism is not very strong but does no longer hold necessarily when the risk
premium mechanism gets stronger (or in other words when financial markets seek to impose stronger
compensation for (perceived) solvency risks). The intuition is that if α is large, for smaller values
of βF , due to the large destabilization effect of the risk premium, it is best for the policymaker to
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Figure 3: Steady state policies as a function of α for the benchmark parameters.
to control debt to be closer to its target value d̄F . So optimal steady state debt is forced to move
into this direction then.
3.5 A bifurcation analysis w.r.t. α
In this subsection we focus on what the effect of α is in the model.
Recall from Proposition 3.3 that for α = 0 the problem has a unique equilibrium point de = γ0
b
if
b > 0 and no equilibrium if b < 0. Furthermore it is easily verified that h(α) in (8) can be rewritten
as
h(α) = −64(f̄ − m̄)3α3 + δ2α2 + δ1α + b2(s2 − 8b), (11)
where δ1 := −4(12(f̄ − m̄)b2− (f̄ − m̄)bs2−9γ0bs+ γ0s3) and δ2 := −4(−(f̄ − m̄)2s2+24b(f̄ − m̄)2−
18(f̄ − m̄)γ0s+ 27γ20). So for small values of α, h(α) ≈ h(0) = b2(s2 − 8b). Combining the results of
both Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 yields then the bifurcation outlined in Table 1.
Table 1: Bifurcation of number of steady states at α = 0 and for small values of α.
sign (b) sign (s2 − 8b) # ss. if α = 0 # ss. if α > 0
+ + 1 3
+ - 1 1
- + 0 3
From the last row of this Table 1 we observe that the introduction of an endogenous risk premium,
in cases where no equilibrium exists, implies that three steady states will occur. Furthermore, we see
from the first row of this table that in case the premium-free game has an equilibrium two additional
steady states may occur if a premium is introduced.
To get an impression how α affects the location of these new steady states, we plotted in Figure
5 steady state debt as a function of α for a set of parameters where b < 0 and h(0) > 0. So the
premium-free game has no equilibrium, whereas for small values of α there are 3 steady state values
of debt. From Figure 5a we see that for very small values of α there is one steady state point at +∞,













(a) Steady state debt as a function of βF .
−− : α = .05
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(b) Steady state policies as a function of βF .
Figure 4: Steady state Debt and policies as a function of βF (= βM ) for the benchmark parameters.
quickly converge to realistic values of debt. Furthermore, for a value of α slightly larger than 0.14,
there is just one steady state value of debt. In case we increase in the simulations f̄ to its benchmark
again, we see a similar behavior and for α ≈ 0.02 already there is just one steady state left. So
including a relative small risk premium implies that a situation where no stable equilibrium path
exists is changed into a realistic situation where such a path does exist.
Next we analyze the number of (positive) steady state values of debt as a function of α for larger
values of α.
First some observations concerning the location of the steady states. Notice that, if γ0 > 0, for every
fixed positive ᾱ there will be at least one positive steady state de since g(ᾱ, 0) > 0, g(ᾱ, d) < 0 for
large d and g(ᾱ, d) is continuous. On the other hand, in case γ0 < 0 and f̄ − m̄ > 0, it follows
directly from the expression of γ0 that necessarily r̄ > θ. So both θ − 3r̄ and γ1 are negative too.
Using Descarte’s rule of signs we have then that for all ᾱ > 0 (7) has only negative roots. So there
are no steady state values of debt with a positive sign.
Next consider the case that α is large. From (11) and Proposition 3.4 we immediately deduce
that
Corollary 3.6 Assume α is large. Then, the game (1-4) has
1. one steady state value of debt if f̄ > m̄
2. three steady state values of debt if f̄ < m̄. 
Finally we analyze how the number of steady states changes if α increases from zero to infinity.
Notice that h(α) is a third degree polynomial in α. Consequently h(α) has at least one and at most
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(b) 0.01 < α < 0.16.
Figure 5: Debt as a function of α with benchmark parameters except f̄ = 0.001; βF = βM = 0.00004.
3 → 1 → 3 → 1 in case f̄ > m̄ and, in case f̄ < m̄, from 1 → 3 → 1 → 3 if all roots are positive.
But, of course, in case, e.g., h(α) has only negative roots the number of steady states won’t change.
Example 3.7 illustrates some cases.
Example 3.7
1. f̄ = 0.01; m̄ = 0; d̄F = 0.6; d̄M = 0.6; βF = βM = 0.04; r̄ = 0.03; θ = 0.75; yields one steady
state for α ≤ 0.12; 3 steady states for 0.13 ≤ α ≤ 0.28 and one steady state again for α ≥ 0.29.
2. f̄ = 0; m̄ = 0.01; d̄F = 0.6; d̄M = 0.6; βF = βM = 0.0004; r̄ = 0.03; θ = 0.1; yields 3 steady
states for all α > 0.
3. with m̄ in 2. replaced by m̄ = 0.05 we get for α ≤ 0.015, 3 steady states; for 0.016 ≤ α ≤ 0.057,
1 steady state; and for α ≥ 0.058, 3 steady states again.
4. f̄ = 0; m̄ = 0.04; d̄F = 0.6; d̄M = 0.6; βF = βM = 0.002; r̄ = 0.03; θ = 0.1; yields one steady
state for α ≤ 0.04; and 3 steady states for α ≥ 0.05. Notice that in this case for α = 0 we have
a negative steady state value of debt which is a saddle point. 
4 Debt Stabilization: The Cooperative Case
In this section we consider the cooperative case. From [9] we have that Pareto efficient solutions are
obtained7 by solving for all ω ∈ (0, 1) the parameterized optimal control problem
7It might be that we still miss some Pareto solutions (see e.g. [19], [20] or [11] for the finite planning horizon case).
However a more detailed analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. We will restrict therefore the analysis




ωLF + (1− ω)LM (12)
subject to
ḋ(t) = r̄d(t) + αd2(t) + f(t)−m(t), d(0) = d0. (13)
Note, that by varying ω between zero and one, one obtains in general a curve of Pareto efficient
solutions. So, if the choice of the coordination parameter is not explicitly agreed upon a priori by
the players the question arises which solution on the Pareto curve will be selected by the players.
We will not further elaborate on this issue here and refer the interested reader to the literature on
bargaining theory. In our examples further on, we will focus in most cases on the case that players
have equal bargaining strengts, i.e. ω = 0.5 and call the cooperative equilibrium in that case the
”social outcome/equilibrium. In the Appendix we prove the next theorem
Theorem 4.1 If (f ∗(.), m∗(.)) ∈ U is a set of Pareto efficient strategies for (1-4), there exist a























ωβF d̄F + (1− ω)βM d̄M
]
, (14)
with d∗(0) = d0 and where both lim
t→∞
d∗(t) = dec and lim
t→∞
µ∗(t) = µec exist. Furthermore the steady
state values (dec, µ
e
c) satisfy
µec := ω(1− ω){r̄dec + αde
2
c + f̄ − m̄}, (15)
where dec is a solution of the third order polynomial equation
gc(d) := −2ω(1− ω)α2d3 + ω(1− ω)α(θ − 3r̄)d2 + γc1d+ γc0 = 0. (16)
Here γc1 := ω(1 − ω)r̄(θ − r̄) − ωβF − (1 − ω)βM − 2ω(1 − ω)α(f̄ − m̄) and γc0 := ωβF d̄F + (1 −
ω)βM d̄M + ω(1− ω)(f̄ − m̄)(θ − r̄). Moreover,
f ∗(t) = f̄ − 1
ω




In the proof of the above theorem it is also shown that (14) has no periodic solutions. Furthermore,
similarly as in the non-cooperative case, it is shown that if steady state debt is positive, the steady
state value of monetary spending is always larger than the corresponding steady state value of fiscal
deficits.
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Remark 4.2 In the Appendix we show in Lemma 6.3 that the open-loop equilibrium strategies
and cooperative strategies are probably intimately related. Though we do not have a conclusive
statement here it is clear that we do have the next result concerning the steady state values. Let
ω1 =
√
ω(1− ω). Then the steady state values (de, µe) corresponding to the open-loop equilibrium







e) are the steady state values corresponding to the cooperative solution
(with weight ω) for this game satisfying (15-16).
This implies, for instance, that the steady state value of debt for the social outcome (i.e. ω = 0.5) is
also obtained as the steady state debt of the non-cooperative open-loop game with parameters α, θ,
f̄ , m̄, r̄, 2βF , 2βM , d̄F and d̄M . That is the steady state debt under a cooperative strategy coincides
with that under a non-cooperative equilibrium where the weight attached to the deviation from its
target values is doubled by both players. 
4.1 No Endogenous Risk Premium
If α = 0, the optimization problem (12-13) is for every ω ∈ (0, 1) a linear quadratic optimal control
problem and has a unique solution. After some rewriting we get the next result from the literature
(see the Appendix).
Theorem 4.3 Let ω ∈ (0, 1) and α = 0. Then the optimization problem (12-13) has the unique
solution
[f ∗(t) m∗(t)]T = −R−1(BTK+ + V )[d∗(t) 1]T ,
where K+ is the unique stabilizing solution of (42).
Furthermore, the minimum cost (12) is [d0 1]K
+[d0 1]
T and the corresponding minimum costs for the




T , i = F,M, respectively. Here the matrices
are as introduced in the proof of the theorem in the Appendix. 
So, different from the non-cooperative case, for every initial debt and choice of parameters there will
always be a unique set of optimal strategies for every fixed choice of the coordination parameter ω.
4.2 Phase Plane Diagrams with Endogenous Risk Premium
The isoclines of system (14) are
µ =
ρc
θ − r̄ − 2αd −
ωβF + (1− ω)βM
2α
and




−(ωβF d̄F+(1−ω)βM d̄M). Replacing (see Remark 4.2) βF by (1−ω)βF
and βM by ωβM we get the isoclines multiplied with a factor ω
2
1 we derived for the non-cooperative
case. So, basically, we get the same phase plane diagrams.
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4.3 Number of Steady States with Endogenous Risk Premium
Notice that with β̃F :=
βF
1−ω and β̃M :=
βM
ω
, gc(d) = ω
2
1g(d), where in g(d), the parameters βi are
replaced by β̃i, i = F,M . Using this we obtain from Proposition 3.4 the next characterization of the
number of steady states.
Proposition 4.4 Let ω ∈ (0, 1) be fixed. Furthermore, let s := θ − 3r̄, γ̃c1 := r̄(θ − r̄)− β̃F − β̃M −
2α(f̄ − m̄), γ̃c0 := β̃F d̄F + β̃M d̄M + (f̄ − m̄)(θ − r̄) and
hc(α) := 8γ̃
3
1 − 36αγ̃0γ̃1s− 4αγ̃0s3 − 108α2γ̃20 + γ̃21s2. (17)
The game (12-13) has
1. one steady state value of debt if either i) hc(α) < 0 or ii) hc(α) = 0 and α
2s2 = 3γ̃1;
2. two steady state values of debt (from which one only applies as an equilibrium if d0 = d
e) if
hc(α) = 0 and α
2s2 6= 3γ̃1;
3. three steady state values of debt (from which the middle only applies as an equilibrium if d0 = d
e)
if hc(α) > 0. 
Combining the results of both Theorem 4.3 and Proposition 4.4 yields then the next bifurcation
Table 2 for small values of α, with b̃ := r̄(r̄ − θ) + β̃F + β̃M .
Table 2: Bifurcation of number of steady states at α = 0 for small values of α.
sign (s2 − 8b̃) # ss. if α = 0 # ss. if α > 0
+ 1 3
- 1 1
From this table we conclude that in case ω is either approximately zero or approximately one,
the introduction of a risk premium will have no effect on the number of steady states. Only for
intermediate values of ω the number of steady states might suddenly increase. That is, if in the
cooperative case either one of the players has a relative strong impact, the inclusion of a risk premium
has not a serious impact on where initial debt will converge to. In case the weight of both players in
the cooperative cost function is approximately the same, the inclusion of a risk premium might be
substantial. That is the height of initial debt can be important in that case to conclude where the
final debt will converge to.
In case the risk premium increases we observe a similar behavior as in the non-cooperative case.
In particular Corollary 3.6 applies in this case too. Furthermore a similar behavior concerning the
number of steady states can happen as we sketched in the paragraph after Corollary 3.6. Again the
number of steady states may switch a couple of times between one and three if the risk parameter α
increases.
Example 4.5 Reconsider the benchmark case, Example 3.5, again. Some elementary calculations
show that for every ω ∈ (0, 1) all coefficients of the third order polynomial hc(α) are negative.
Consequently, hc(α) < 0 for every α > 0. So for every coordination parameter the cooperative game
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Figure 6: Debt as a function of ω for the benchmark parameters with α = 0.05 and α = 0.01.
4.4 Effect of Endogenous Risk Premium on Steady State Debt and Ac-
tions
In this section we analyze in some more detail the effect of the endogenous risk parameter α on the
steady state value of debt dec and actions.
For the benchmark case the steady state value of debt for the social outcome is 0.6028. In Figure
6 we plotted the steady state value of debt as a function of the coordination parameter ω. A fiscal
player with a higher (bargaining) weight ω in the cooperative equilibrium, implies that intrinsically
a larger share of the debt stabilization burden is shifted to the monetary player resulting in higher
money growth and more fiscal consolidation.
We plotted the graph for the benchmark parameters and for the case that the parameter α is
changed into α = 0.01. The figure illustrates that steady state debt is in this case a decreasing
function of α.
The next analysis shows that this property holds for a broad class of parameter values. To that





















So under the assumption that there is a unique steady state value of debt for the cooperative case,
which implies in particular that ∂gc
∂d
(α, dec) < 0, we have that sign(d
e
′




Consequently, in case e.g. f̄ ≥ m̄, θ ≤ 3r̄ and γ0 ≥ 0 (which implies in particular that dec ≥ 0), by
(10), de
′
c (α) < 0 for all ω. That is, under these parametric conditions, the steady state debt decreases
if the endogenous risk premium increases. This, irrespective of the specific choice of the coordination
parameter.
In Figure 7a we plotted the steady state values of the control strategies as a function of the
coordination parameter. In this figure we also plotted the corresponding non-cooperative steady
state policies f e and me. We see that the steady state policies are almost a linear function of the
coordination parameter ω. Furthermore we observe from this graph that in case fiscal authorities
have a dominant position in determining the cooperative welfare function (i.e. ω ≈ 1) there is a
change in the sign of fiscal policies compared to the non-cooperative case.
In that case, a steady-state fiscal deficit (f e > 0) is produced accompanied by high money
growth; with high values of omega, fiscal and monetary policy are more expansionary than in the
non-cooperative case, for small values of omega fiscal and monetary policies are less expansionary in
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(b) Control gaps if α changes from 0.01 to 0.05.
Figure 7: (Change in) steady state controls for benchmark parameters.
preferences dominate the cooperative welfare function a strategy of almost no monetary policy accom-
panied by a strong fiscal consolidation is pursued, since the debt stabilization burden is transferred
entirely to the fiscal player.
In Figure 7b we plotted the difference, denoted by ∆f , between the steady state fiscal strategy
at α = 0.05 and α = 0.01 as a function of the coordination parameter ω. In the same plot we
also visualized this difference for the steady state monetary policy. From the graph we see that
for α = 0.05 a more (negative) active fiscal policy is pursued than for α = 0.01. Furthermore we
see that for ω = 1 the increase of α has no effect. We observe that this gap is an almost linear
function of ω too. Notice that the policy change is, for not too high coordination parameters,
relatively quite substantial. For monetary policy we observe an asymmetric reaction compared to
fiscal policy. In particular we see that for larger α more (positive) control action is used. This
asymmetric reaction is explained by (36) from which we have that independent of the specific choice
of α, ωf ec + (1− ω)mec = (1− ω)m̄+ ωf̄ . Consequently, ω∆f ec + (1− ω)∆mec = 0.
In Figure 8a we plotted for the social outcome (i.e. ω = 0.5) the steady state control actions
as a function of the risk premium for the benchmark parameters. Both policies are almost linear
functions of α. We see that fiscal policy is a decreasing, slightly convex, function of α and monetary
policy an increasing, slightly concave, function of α. Again notice that the relative changes in the
level of pursued policies is quite large. In Figure 8b we plotted the difference w.r.t. the corresponding
non-cooperative policies. We see that the differences between both modes of play are marginal for
both policies. Particularly for small values of the risk premium there is almost no difference between
both modes of play. For larger values of the risk premium we see that policies are more actively used
in a cooperative mode of play.
5 Some Additional Aspects of the non-cooperative versus
the Cooperative Case












(a) Social steady state controls as a function of α.
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Figure 8: Steady state control if ω = 1
2
for benchmark parameters.
5.1 Differences in Steady State Variables
First we analyze in some more detail the gap between steady state debt under a cooperative versus




1−ω [(θ − r̄)(r̄d̄F + f̄ − m̄)] + βM 1−ωω [(θ − r̄)(r̄d̄M + f̄ − m̄)] + βFβM 1−2ω(1−ω)ω (d̄F − d̄M)





So, in case b = (r̄(r̄−θ)+βF +βM) > 0, θ ≥ r̄, f̄ ≥ m̄ and either ω = 0.5 or d̄F = d̄M it is obvious that
de(0)− dec(0) > 0. Assuming additionally that the non-cooperative game will have a unique steady
state value of debt for α > 0 too, we have by the implicit function theorem again that for small α > 0
steady state debt in the non-cooperative case will be larger than steady state debt for the cooperative
case too. For the social outcome we plotted this gap as a function of the risk premium parameter
α in Figure 9. The plot confirms the above analysis that for small α steady state debt in the non-
cooperative case will be larger than in the cooperative case. However, we also see that this gap
decreases if α becomes larger and in fact for values of α larger than approximately 0.06, steady state
debt in the cooperative case is actually larger than in the non-cooperative case. Interestingly, values
between 0.05 and 0.1 are actually typically found in empirical studies that estimate the effect from
the debt level on the risk premium. Generally, this leads to the insight that from a debt minimization
point of view a cooperative mode of play seems only preferable to a non-cooperative mode of play,
in case the strength of the non-linear risk premium mechanism is not too large: beyond a threshold
level of the risk premium parameter, α , steady-state debt is actually lower in the non-cooperative
equilibrium than in the cooperative equilibrium. This result therefore modifies the original result
of Tabellini (1986) who stated in his Proposition 2 that steady-state debt is always lower in the
cooperative equilibrium than in the non-cooperative equilibrium (assuming α = 0, the linear debt
dynamics case).
Finally we notice that the gap between steady state values of monetary and fiscal spending is less in
the cooperative case than in the non-cooperative case, provided de ≥ dec ≥ 0, as (me−f e)−(mec−f ec ) =
(r + α(de + dec))(d
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Figure 9: Gap between steady state debt for non-cooperative and social outcome as a function of α
for the benchmark parameters.
is the case if the risk premium is not too large (α smaller than 0.06). For a larger impact of this
premium the opposite conclusion holds.
5.2 Difference in Closed-loop Behavior
Assuming that there is just one saddle-point we next compare the convergence speed of debt towards
this steady state for the non-cooperative and cooperative case, respectively. For the non-cooperative









In a similar way we obtain that for the cooperative case the negative eigenvalue of the linearized


















= −6α2de + 2α(θ − 3r̄)de + γ1 − [−6α2de
2












So in case the game has a positive steady state for α = 0 and a unique positive steady state for







> 0. So in those cases the convergence speed towards its
steady state value will be larger in the cooperative case than in the non-cooperative case. That is,
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Figure 10: Convergence speed for the benchmark parameters as a function of α for non-cooperative
and social outcome.
setting. Notice that this conclusion does not depend on the specific choice of ω. This result confirms
the Proposition 1 of Tabellini’s paper (1986) that the adjustment speed in a cooperative setting is
higher than the adjustment speed in a non-cooperative setting.







) = sign(−12αde2 +
2(θ − 3r̄)de − 2(f̄ − m̄)). So, if θ < 3r̄, the convergence speed will increase if α increases. That











it follows that a similar conclusion holds w.r.t. the convergence speed in the
cooperative case.
Finally notice that an increase of the debt parameter βF in the cost function usually will lead to

















(βF )(−12αde + θ − 3r̄)).
Therefore, usually, s
′
(βF ) < 0. Precise statements can be made by using the implicit function
theorem again to calculate de
′
(βF ). This is, however, left as an exercise to the reader here.
5.3 Adjustment Dynamics
It is interesting to analyze the adjustment dynamics of debt, deficits and money growth in our
benchmark case, Example 3.5, introduced earlier. It allows to illustrate the analytical results w.r.t.
long-run properties derived in Section 3 and 4 and to give the reader an insight into the typical
adjustment dynamics produced by the dynamic debt stabilization game. Figures 11-138 provide the
8These figures visualize the first part of the time plots generated by considering a long planning horizon (instead
of infinity). The last parts of these plots are not shown because they show behavior that is due to the consideration
of a finite planning horizon.
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Figure 11: Dynamic adjustment for α = 0.05 with benchmark parameters.













































































Figure 12: Dynamic adjustment for α = 0 with benchmark parameters.
adjustment dynamics produced by this example. In Figure 11 a value of α = 0.05 is used. For
comparison, we also provide outcomes in case α = 0 (Figure 12) and α = 0.1 (Figure 13).




































































Figure 13: Dynamic adjustment for α = 0.1 with benchmark parameters.
In case of the relatively modest risk premium mechanism, α = 0.05, we observe that debt adjusts
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faster under cooperation than in the non-cooperative case and steady-state debt is higher in the
non-cooperative case. In the cooperative case, both policymakers act initially more decisive on debt
stabilization, inducing higher money growth and higher fiscal surpluses than in the non-cooperative
case. This enables a lower effort in the long run: in the long run money growth and fiscal surplus
are actually smaller under cooperation than under non-cooperation. If we compare this with the
case of no risk premium, α = 0 (Figure 12), we arrive at a similar picture: debt is lower in the
long-run under cooperation, money growth is initially higher and fiscal consolidation stronger under
cooperation than in the absence of cooperation but in the long run the opposite holds. Moreover,
we see that with α = 0, the difference between long-run debt in the cooperative and non-cooperative
case increases compared to the case with α = 0.05: the endogenous risk-premium is able -in this
case- to reduce the distance between the cooperative and non-cooperative case by incorporating the
externality effects in the debt stabilization game.
Outcomes are fundamentally changed if we introduce a stronger risk premium mechanism, α = 0.1
(Figure 13). In that case, debt is actually stabilized stronger in case of non-cooperation. In steady-
state, debt, the fiscal surplus and money growth are larger under cooperation than under non-
cooperation. From Figure 9 we anticipated already such a result that would start to appear around
α > 0.06. A strong endogenous risk premium, in other words, changes quite substantially the optimal
strategies and the resulting debt stabilization over time. Cooperation is no longer the preferred
equilibrium as welfare losses under cooperation now exceed losses under non-cooperation. These
effects can be understood if one realizes that the adjustment dynamics and long-run equilibrium
of the debt stabilization game are fundamentally changed by the presence of financial markets that
impose an endogenous risk premium. As already discussed before, the results obtained by Tabellini on
the linear case without risk premia, therefore, do not generally hold in the presence of an endogenous
risk premium (they do essentially in case the risk premium mechanism is small e.g. in times of very
tranquil financial markets, but once the strength of the endogenous risk premium increases, the debt
stabilization game and its outcomes changes fundamentally). Note also that the long-run differences
between the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibrium increase also when we compare α = 0.05
and α = 0.1, as was also observed when we compared α = 0.05 and α = 0 (and anticipated from
Figure 8 and 9).
Comparing all three cases, we observe that in this benchmark case both under cooperation and
non-cooperation, steady-state debt is lower in the presence of a stronger endogenous risk premium
mechanism. A stronger endogenous risk premium, increases the long-run interest rate burden from
debt and therefore a higher long-run stabilization need: steady-state money growth and fiscal sur-
pluses are larger when the endogenous risk premium mechanism is stronger.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyzed the impact of an endogenous risk premium on debt and policies in a
simple dynamic game between the fiscal and monetary authorities in a country. This paper extends
the Tabellini (1986) model by the inclusion of a debt-dependent risk premium. Both a cooperative
mode and a non-cooperative mode of play are considered.
Due to its simple structure it is possible to solve (at least partially) the model analytically. In fact
we could completely solve analytically the cooperative game. For the non-cooperative case we could
derive analytic expressions for the evolution of debt by a coordinate transformation. This enhanced
to analyze debt from the resulting necessary conditions in a two-dimensional system. Unfortunately,
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it is not possible to track the corresponding non-cooperative policies analytically. However, we
indicated how in some cases (including our benchmark case that represents outcomes under a broad
range of -economically relevant- parameter values) one can still compute these policies numerically.
We showed that by including this risk premium the game always has at least one and at most
three equilibria. The number of equilibria may fluctuate with the value of the risk premium. In case
there is one equilibrium we showed that for every initial debt, debt converges to this stationary value.
In case three different equilibria occur, it depends on initial debt which equilibrium realizes. The
middle equilibrium is unstable and the outer two equilibria are stable. The case that two equilibria
occur happens only in rare cases and an in depth analysis of this case is therefore skipped.
We also observed that every cooperative equilibrium can be realized as a non-cooperative equi-
librium by changing the relative preference concerning debt stabilization of the central bank with
a factor 1/ω and that of the fiscal authority with a factor 1/(1 − ω), where ω is the value of the
coordination parameter used in the cooperative welfare function.
For the benchmark case we analyzed the model in some more detail. Some conclusions from this
study are the following. The parameter that measures the strength of the risk premium mechanism,
is of crucial importance in the debt stabilization game. Under both modes of play equilibrium debt
decreases in case the strength of the risk premium parameter increases. Nevertheless, the effect of
the risk premium on the level of equilibrium debt seems to be not as strong as the effect on pursued
policies (the instruments of the players).
From a debt minimization point of view a cooperative mode of play seems only preferable to
a non-cooperative mode of play in case the strength of the non-linear risk premium mechanism is
not too large: beyond a threshold level of the risk premium parameter, steady-state debt is actually
lower in the non-cooperative equilibrium than in the cooperative equilibrium. This result therefore
modifies the original result of Tabellini (1986) that steady-state debt is always lower in the cooperative
equilibrium than in the non-cooperative equilibrium. Another result that generalizes only partially
to the debt stabilization game with an endogenous risk premium, is the finding by Tabellini that in
the non-cooperative case, a reduction of the weight attached to debt stabilization always increases
steady-state debt, increases the adjustment burden of the other player and reduces the adjustment
speed. If the nonlinearity is small, this result is also likely to be present, but in case the non-linearity
is strong, we showed that the first-mentioned result is no longer necessarily present as the strong
nonlinearity totally changes the dynamic game and the optimal strategies.
Furthermore, we found that the convergence speed towards the equilibrium is larger under a
(social) cooperative mode of play than under a non-cooperative mode of play. The introduction of
the endogenous risk premium does not affect this result found by Tabellini.
Finally we observed that in a cooperative mode of play different equilibria may occur only in case
the preferences of both players are approximately treated on an equal footing. Moreover we see that
from a debt minimization point of view the social outcome gives the highest steady-state debt.
From our general analysis it follows that the results obtained for the benchmark case may change
significantly if different parameter settings occur. As already mentioned, for instance, multiple
equilibria can occur. One topic for future research could be to identify parameter settings yielding
similar behavior.
Another point of interest is to analyze this problem under the assumption that the policy makers
use linear state feedback policy rules. Since the optimal feedback parameters become in that case a
function of the initial debt, this brings on an additional dimension to the problem.
Finally, last but not least, it is interesting to adapt the model for the nominal long term interest
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rate and to extend this model to a multi-county model and analyze, e.g., the dispute about the
bail-out clause we mentioned in the introduction section of this model.
Appendix
The Open Loop Case
Proof of Theorem 3.1:
Let (f ∗(.), m∗(.)) ∈ U be a set of open-loop Nash strategies and d∗(.) the corresponding debt trajec-
tory.




e−θt(f − f̄)2 + 1
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e−θt(m− m̄)2 + 1
2
e−θtβM(d− d̄M)2 + λM(r̄d+ αd2 + f −m), (20)
respectively. It is easily verified that this is a normal problem and by Pontryagin’s maximum principle
there exist continuous and piecewise continuous differentiable functions λ∗i (.), i = F,M, f
∗(.), m∗(.)
and d∗(.) that satisfy the equations:








= e−θtβM(d− d̄M) + λM(r̄ + 2αd), (23)
where f ∗(t) = f̄ − eθtλ∗F (t) and m∗(t) = m̄ + eθtλ∗M(t) (since ∂HF∂f =
∂HM
∂m







> 0). ). Since by assumption f ∗(t) and m∗(t) converge, it follows that λ∗i (t), i = F,M,
converge exponentially to zero. This implies in particular that the limiting transversality conditions
lim
t→∞
λ∗i (t)(d(t) − d∗(t)) ≥ 0 hold. Consequently, the above necessary conditions are sufficient too
in case for instance both minimized Hamiltonians are convex in d along the optimal shadow price
paths. Some elementary calculations show that this is the case iff βF + 2α(f̄ − f ∗(t)) ≥ 0 and
βM + 2α(m̄−m∗(t)) ≥ 0, respectively.







































Or, introducing µi := e
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Notice that, since by assumption f ∗(.) and m∗(.) converge, µ∗i (t), i = F,M, converges too and
f e = f̄ − µeF and me = m̄+ µeM , respectively. (26)
Consequently, with µ(t) := µF (t)+µM(t), lim
t→∞







to zero. Using this in (25) it follows, by adding the second and third equation, that debt and µ(t)







αd2(t)− µ(t) + r̄d(t) + f̄ − m̄












= θ. So, if θ 6= 0, by Bendixson’s theorem (see e.g. [9][p.88]), this system of
differential equations has no periodic solutions. Furthermore the steady state values are obtained as
the solutions de of
g(d) := (αd2 + r̄d+ f̄ − m̄)(θ − r̄ − 2αd) + βF (d̄F − d) + βM(d̄M − d) = 0, (28)
with µe := r̄de+αde
2
+ f̄ − m̄. Some rewriting of (28) shows that de is the solution of the third order
polynomial equation (7). Moreover notice that (27) can be rewritten as (5).
Finally notice that, if de > 0, me − f e = m̄− f̄ + µe = r̄de + αde2 ≥ 0. 
Corollary 6.1 From (25) it follows that the steady state values are µei =
βi(de−d̄i)
θ−r̄−2αde , i = F,M. So,
by (26), the corresponding equilibrium actions converge to the steady state values f e := f̄ − µeF and
me := m̄+ µeM , respectively.




M . Furthermore we have then that











Proof of Proposition 3.3.
First notice that, since α = 0, the conditions of Theorem 3.1 are sufficient too (see the proof of
Theorem 3.1).








θ − r̄ 1
βF + βM r̄
] [
f̄ − m̄






































. Consequently, the steady state is a saddle-point if
b > 0. Therefore, choosing µ(0) such that (d(0), µ(0)) is on the saddle-path of (5) (which is the line
corresponding with the first column of matrix S in this case (and from which it is easily verified that
it is not vertical)), yields an appropriate solution.
Notice that if b < 0, the steady state will be an unstable node. So, if b < 0, the problem has no
solution if d0 6= de since all candidate optimal trajectories diverge from the steady state. If d0 = de,
9By introducing another variable ν(t) := µF (t) − µM (t) we have that (d(t), µF (t), µM (t)) solve (25) if and only if
(d(t), µ(t), ν(t)) solve (27) and the differential equation ν̇(t) = (θ− r̄−2αd(t))ν(t)+βF (d̄F −d(t))−βM (d̄M −d(t)) =:
f3(d(t), ν(t)). So by considering this coordination transformation we triangularized the system dynamics.
25
the stationary trajectory satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.1. So only for this initial condition
we have an open-loop Nash equilibrium.









(r̄−θ)b . So that βMµ
e
F − βFµeM = βF βM (d̄F−d̄M )r−θ . By substituting
in these expressions d̄F = d̄M and using (26) one obtains the results advertised in part 4. of Propo-
sition 3.2. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
In case there is a steady state, from (5), the linearized system around this steady state is described
by:
ẏ = Ly :=
[
r̄ + 2αde −1
−βF − βM − 2αµe θ − r̄ − 2αde
]
y. (29)







(ignoring the special case that one eigenvalue becomes zero) we see that the steady states will be
either unstable or saddle-points. From the sign scheme of the partial derivative ∂g
∂d
at the steady












Table 1B: sp=saddle point; un=unstable node
Notice that the unstable steady state will be a focus if θ2 − 4∂g
∂d
< 0 and a node if θ2 − 4∂g
∂d
> 0.
To determine the conditions under which (7) has either one, two or three solutions let γ3 := −2α2
and γ2 := α(θ − 3r̄). With this notation (7) is a cubic equation of the form
γ3d
3 + γ2d
2 + γ1d+ γ0 = 0. (30)
Next consider the discriminant
∆ := 18γ3γ2γ1γ0 − 4γ32γ0 + γ22γ21 − 4γ3γ31 − 27γ23γ20 . (31)
Then (see e.g. [14]) (30) has one real root if ∆ < 0; a multiple real root if ∆ = 0; and three distinct
real roots if ∆ > 0.
Simple calculations show that in case there is a multiple root this root occurs three times if and only
if γ22 = 3γ1. With s := θ − 3r̄ one verifies that
∆ = α2(8γ31 − 36αγ1γ0s− 4αγ0s3 − 108α2γ20 + γ21s2).














Figure 14: Phase plane diagram of system (5) if ρ = 0.
Additional Phase plane diagrams system (5).
In Figures 11 and 12 we visualized the phase plane diagrams of system (5) in case ρ = 0 and ρ > 0,
respectively. Figure 11.c suggests that in case there are three steady states probably an unstable
focus occurs at the steady state de = θ−r̄
2α
. This is confirmed, e.g., if we consider the case θ = 0.1,
r̄ = 0.03, α = 0.05, βF = βM = 0.04, d̄F = d̄M = 0.7, f̄ = 0 and m̄ = 1. To prove this property for
the general case seems, however, not to be completely trivial. A similar remark applies w.r.t. Figure
12.c. This figure suggests that the unstable steady state will always be a node. However, again, we
could not directly come up with a conclusive argument here.
The Cooperative Case
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
The Hamiltonian for problem (12-13) is
H = ωLF + (1− ω)LM + λ(r̄d+ αd2 + f −m).
The necessary conditions for existence of an optimal solution are then
ḋ(t) = r̄d(t) + αd2(t) + f(t)−m(t) (32)
λ̇(t) = −ωβFe−θt(d(t)− d̄F )− (1− ω)βMe−θt(d(t)− d̄M)− λ(t)(r̄ + 2αd(t)) (33)
eθtλ(t) = −ω(f(t)− f̄) (34)
eθtλ(t) = (1− ω)(m(t)− m̄). (35)
From (34) and (35) we immediately have for any Pareto solution the next relationship between
optimal monetary financing and fiscal deficits
















Figure 15: Phase plane diagram of system (5) if ρ > 0.
Introducing µ(t) := eθtλ(t) the above equations (32-35) can be rewritten as
ḋ(t) = r̄d(t) + αd2(t) + f(t)−m(t)
µ̇(t) = −ωβF (d(t)− d̄F )− (1− ω)βM(d(t)− d̄M)− µ(−θ + r̄ + 2αd(t))
µ(t) = −ω(f(t)− f̄) (37)
µ(t) = (1− ω)(m(t)− m̄). (38)
Since we are only interested in strategies which converge, it follows from (34) that µ should
converge. So, the optimal control and state trajectory are solutions that converge to the steady








ω(1−ω)µ(t) + r̄d(t) + f̄ − m̄














= θ. So, if θ 6= 0, by Bendixson’s theorem, this system of differential equations
has no periodic solutions. Furthermore the steady state values are obtained as the solutions dec of
gc(d) := ω(1− ω)(αd2 + r̄d+ f̄ − m̄)(θ − r̄ − 2αd) + ωβF (d̄F − d) + (1− ω)βM(d̄M − d) = 0, (40)
with µec := ω(1−ω){r̄dec +αde
2
c + f̄ − m̄}. Some rewriting of (40) shows that dec is the solution of the
third order polynomial equation (16). Moreover notice that (39) can be rewritten as (14). Finally
notice that, if dec ≥ 0, mec − f ec = rdec + αde
2
c ≥ 0. 
Corollary 6.2 By (37), f(t) = f̄ − 1
ω
µ(t), and by (38), m(t) = m̄ + 1
1−ωµ(t). Consequently, the
steady state values are f ec := f̄ − 1ωµec = ωf̄ +(1−ω)m̄− (1−ω)(r̄dec +αde
2







ωf̄ + (1− ω)m̄+ ω(r̄dec + αde
2
c ), respectively.















Lemma 6.3 let ω ∈ (0, 1) be an arbitrary number and ω1 :=
√
ω(1− ω).
(d∗(.), µ∗(.)) ∈ U satisfy (5) if and only if (d∗c(.), µ∗c(.)) := (d∗(.), ω21µ∗(.)) ∈ U satisfy (14) with βF
replaced by (1− ω)βF and βM replaced by ωβM .
Proof.
Assume (d∗(.), µ∗(.)) ∈ U solve (5). Next consider, for a fixed ω ∈ (0, 1), (d∗c(.), µ∗c(.)) := (d∗(.), ω21µ∗(.)).
Elementary calculations show then, that (d∗c(.), µ
∗






















ωβ̃F d̄F + (1− ω)β̃M d̄M
]
,
where β̃F := (1 − ω)βF and β̃M := ωβM . That is, (d∗c(.), µ∗c(.)) satisfies (14) with βi replaced by
β̃i, i = F,M . 
Proof Theorem 4.3.
Let d̃ := e−
1
2
θtd(t); c(t) := e−
1
2
θt; f̃(t) := e−
1
2
θtf(t); m̃(t) := e−
1
2
θtm(t); x(t) := [d̃(t) c(t)]T and







































































ωβF + (1− ω)βM −(ωβF d̄F + (1− ω)βM d̄M)














The solution of this optimization problem (41) is (see e.g. [10])
u∗(t) = −R−1(BTK+ + V )x(t),
where K+ is the unique stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation
ATK +KA− (KB + V )R−1(BTK + V T ) +Q. (42)
Furthermore the minimal cost of (41) are xT0K
+x0. The corresponding cost using the optimal control
for the individual players are, with Acl := A− BR−1(BTK+ + V ), Li = 12xT0 M̃ix0, i = F,M , where
M̃i is the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation
ATclM̃i + M̃iAcl = −[I − (K+B + V )R−1]Mi[I − (K+B + V )R−1]T .
From this the conclusions stated in the theorem readily follow. 
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